Sunday, August 2, 2009

Ambassador Seijiro Yoshizawa 0.ww Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

363. Secretary Ichiro Kawasaki is Ordered Home

On September 6, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda ordered that Secretary Kawasaki in Santiago return to Japan.[949] Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

(d) Colombia

364. Special Courier to Bring Secret Documents to Bogota

According to a dispatch on October 14, 1941 a special courier from Santiago was departing for Bogota with secret documents.[950] Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

365. Minister Iungo Yanai Condemns Lack of Security in Commercial Dispatches

The insecure communications of Japanese business firms had been of great concern to Minister Tomii in Argentina. In addition, on August 16, 1941, Japan's Minister to Colombia, Mr. Jungo Yanai, who had just returned from Ecuador,[951] expressed anxiety over a plain text telegram regarding the purchase of platinum, which an undisclosed Tokyo commercial firm had sent to its representative. The same message had been handled in Japanese diplomatic code some days before. The Japanese Minister advised that if this practice were to continue, it would not only damage Japan's import trade, but it would jeopardize the reputations of both himself and Naval Attache Shigehiro. If such secret information leaked out, Japan would not be able to make any further purchases of platinum, and Minister Yanai urged that more caution be taken in the future.[952]

On October 1, 1941 Minister Yanai again warned against laxity in transmitting commercial messages. Referring to a cable received by a businessman of Bogota from a Mitsui official in New York, which included not only detailed explanations of some secret plan, but had also transmitted the wrong instructions, Minister Yanai warned that he did not believe it safe to send messages between New York, Tokyo and Colombia on this matter. He asked that the Japanese Navy Department issue orders to the Mitsui Company to this effect.

The fact that the local press was calling the attention of the public to the large amounts of valuable materials secretly being exported to Japan and Germany caused Minister Yanai to reiterate his pleas for caution at this time. He revealed that the government of Colombia, in an attempt to check these exports, was sending secret investigators throughout the country.[953]

366. Minister Yanai Requests Additional Funds

On October 7, 1941 Minister Yanai, indicating that he had been successful in obtaining some desired items, requested additional funds from the Naval Attache in Mexico City.[954]

(e) Ecuador-Peru

367. Messrs. Watanabe and Makizawa Leave Peru for Ecuador

Messrs. Noboru Watanabe and Makizawa, two Japanese officials, were scheduled to leave Callao, Peru on the Santa Luisa on September 11, 1941. After making a landing at Quayaquil, they would travel to Quito by train.[955]

[949] III, 694.
[950] III, 695.
[951] III, 696.
[952] III, 697.
[953] III, 698.
[954] III, 699.
[955] III, 700.

[197]

368. Peruvian-Ecuadorean Border Dispute Continues

A border dispute between Peru and Ecuador continued through August and October, 1941 with armed conflicts taking place sporadically throughout the period. Little traffic concerning Ecuador was intercepted during this period, but Minister Yanai accredited to Bogota, Colombia kept the Japanese government informed of current events.

369. Ecuador Blames Standard Oil Company for Border Incident

The President of Ecuador believed that Peru's aggression had been incited by the Standard Oil Company, which he said, possessed vested interests in the southern part of Peru, and was attempting to encroach upon the rights of the Shell Oil Company in the Cuenca and adjacent area of Ecuador.

The United States had sold fifteen bombers to Peru, but had refused to send five planes or any military supplies to Ecuador. Because of this Ecuador could not subscribe to the United States' plan for Pan-American solidarity. The Japanese Minister believed that Ecuador would not send a representative to the approaching Good Neighbor conference unless the border question was settled.[956]

370. President Arroyo Del Rio Clears Japanese Commercial Experts

On September 18, 1941 Minister Yanai reported that Mr. Juan Martinez, an intimate friend of the Provisional President of Ecuador, Dr. Carlos A. Arroyo Del Rio, had made a special report which had resulted in a complete transformation of the President's attitude toward Japanese commercial experts who had been forced to leave the country. The President stated that all suspicions formerly directed against the Japanese experts had been dispelled, but owing to the unstable internal and foreign conditions of the country, he felt that their return at this time would be a bit premature. However, by the end of the month he might ask them to return.[957]

371. Peruvian Minister Accuses Ecuador of Creating Border Incident

According to a confidential report given to Minister Hisashi Nanjo at Havana by the Peruvian Minister, negotiations were being carried on between the United States and Ecuador for a ninety-nine year lease of the Galapagos, off the west coast of Ecuador. Since Ecuador was not able to withstand American pressure, its government was attempting to obtain as much as possible under the circumstances. The Peruvian Minister stated that Ecuador had deliberately instigated a border dispute in order to benefit from an advantageous solution by the United States, which would be asked to mediate in the name of hemispheric cooperation. Ecuador even hoped to obtain lend-lease materials from the United States.

According to the Peruvian Minister, this maneuver had not been successful for although the Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Sumner Welles, had summoned the Peruvian Ambassador in Washington and had made a veiled threat by announcing that the United States had decided to give two destroyers to Ecuador, Brazil had withdrawn from the mediation and the situation was disadvantageous to Ecuador.[958]

372. Minister Sakamoto Requests Azuma Maru Be Sent to Lima

On October 8, 1941 Minister Sakamoto in Lima requested that the Japanese Navy Department order the Azuma Maru to stop at a Peruvian post on its return voyage to Tokyo to take on materials accumulated there. It was expected that possibly 2,000 tons of cargo in excess of the previous estimate could be loaded. Minister Sakamoto requested an immediate reply.[959]

[956] III, 701.
[957] III, 702.
[958] III, 703.
[959] III, 704.

[198]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

373. Japan Attempts to Bribe Peruvian Officials

Foreign Minister Toyoda informed Minister Sakamoto in Lima that he was shipping to the Peruvian Finance Minister a set of European style dishes specially manufactured by the Nagoya China Company, and five Cloisonne flower vases to the Chief Assistant to the Finance Minister. These gifts were to be presented to the Peruvian officials with the compliments of Japan, and with the secret hope that Japan would get what it wanted from them more easily.[960] However, on October 14, 1941 Minister Sakamoto advised Tokyo that there was no hope of negotiating with the Peruvian government.[961]

374. Mr. Kihara Replaces Secretary Matsumoto in Peru

Minister Sakamoto in Lima advised the Japanese office in Panama that Secretary Bunazburo Matsumoto planned to leave Lima with secret documents and was scheduled to arrive in Cristobal, Venezuela on the Imperia on October 12, 1941.[962 ]When Tokyo requested that the Lima office reserve passage on the Terukawa Maru for Mr. Matsumoto, who desired to sail on that ship,[963] Mr. Sakamoto responded on October 14, 1941 that the new successor to Secretary Matsumoto, Secretary Jitaro Kihara, was encountering difficulty in obtaining travel expenses. He urged that Tokyo investigate this matter immediately.[964]

375. Japan Continues Trade with Peru

On October 14, 1941 the Terukawa Maru, according to Foreign Minister Toyoda had space available for 135 tons of cargo, which Japanese officials in Lima were to fill with materials necessary to Japan. Although the proper procedure was to have the Japanese Minister obtain these materials from the Peruvian government, the Japanese Foreign Office had decided that the respective private firms would import the materials and issue their own letters of credit. The Foreign Minister advised that every precaution be taken to avoid misunderstanding in the settlement of price between the Peruvian government and the sellers on the one hand and the Japanese firms on the other.

Since there were no prospects at present for assigning a ship to transport salt, the Foreign Minister asked that the Japanese representatives bargain with the Peruvian government for 250,000 sol of salt by telling them that a ship would soon be assigned by Japan to export it. Japan desired to remit the price each time an importation of salt was effected. Foreign Minister Toyoda also advised that a supply of sugar be obtained so that Japanese dealers could sell it in Peru.[965]

Upon learning that the Terukawa Maru might take aboard freight at Callao, Minister Yanai at Bogota, Colombia urged that the Japanese Embassy in Argentina be informed when the ship put into port.[966] Foreign Minister Toyoda replied that the Terukawa Maru would not be able to stop at Bogota and asked that Minister Yanai confer with the Argentina Ambassador to urge that he board this ship at Callao.[967]

[960] III, 705.
[961] III, 706.
[962] III, 707.
[963] III, 708.
[964] III, 709.
[965] III, 710.
[966] III, 711.
[967] III, 712.

[199]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

PART C—JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD

(f) Japanese-British Relations

376. British Freezing Order Impels Japanese to Evacuate Hongkong

Suspecting that an order freezing Japanese assets would be put into effect throughout the British Empire, Japanese representatives in Hongkong reported to their Foreign Minister in August, 1941 that considerable unrest was apparent among the Japanese residents who feared that Japanese ships would be denied entrance to the harbor.[968] When disclosing this situation to its representative in Canton on August 6, 1941, Tokyo inquired about the possibility of evacuating Japanese nationals by way of Canton.

In the meantime, an attempt was made to secure guarantees from English officials that Japanese ships would be permitted to leave Hongkong.[969] On August 8, 1941 Hongkong reported that since the Shirogane Maru was leaving Canton unimpeded and that since British authorities were not impeding the Takuun Maru then docked at Hongkong, no interference with Japanese shipping was anticipated, though the British had not as yet given any guarantee.

Nevertheless, preparations continued for the evacuation of approximately 110 subjects, the majority of whom were families of the Japanese staff and residents in Hongkong. With all mail steamers filled to capacity, it was suggested that the Kamo Maru, after leaving Kakao on August 20, 1941, take aboard some of these people at Hongkong. At the same time Japanese vessels were warned to prepare for detailed inspection of all cargoes by the British civil administration.[970]

Realizing that an official order to evacuate Hongkong would heighten the already critical situation, the Chief of the East Asia Bureau advised on August 10, 1941 that the withdrawal of Japanese subjects should give the appearance of being carried out under their own initiative.[971]

378. Rumors Indicate Japanese Evacuation Near Johore

In other sections of the Near East Japanese subjects were also preparing to return to their home land. Learning from a Singapore news dispatch of August 16, 1941 that Japanese near Johore in the Malay States had been ordered to evacuate, Tokyo, on August 23, 1941, requested verification of the report and complete details.[973]

379. Japanese Officials and News Correspondents Prepare to Leave London

At this time high ranking officials, including Lieutenant Colonel Yoshii and Commander Nakano, the assistant military and naval attaches at the Japanese Embassy in London, as well as Mr. Hasegawa and Mr. Nakamura, special news correspondents representing the Domei and Asahi syndicates respectively, prepared to leave London. The Japanese Ambassador in London inquired on August 20, 1941 concerning the advisability of these men returning to Japan via Panama in view of their military status and the existing international situation.[974]

[968] III, 713.
[969] III, 714.
[970] III, 715.
[971] III, 716.
[973] III, 718.
[974] III, 719.

[201] [200 blank]

380. Japanese Considers Bartering with British

Although evacuation plans were of major importance during the months of August and September, 1941, the problem of stabilizing trade relations between Japan and Great Britain was of equal concern. Since, according to Tokyo, by freezing Japanese funds and by abrogating treaties Great Britain had greatly curtailed Japanese commerce, Japan was willing to give careful consideration to a British proposal for the use of barter in trade between the two countries. Japan decided that the agreement would facilitate the settlement of its banks' financial problems, yet was anxious lest too prompt acceptance of the British proposal expose Japan's position. However, on August 15, 1941 Tokyo instructed its Embassy in London to order Mr. Kitaro Kato to arrange negotiations with the British and Netherlands East Indies banks.[975]

At the same time Japan continued to study the terms of the proposed agreement pertaining to the type of British commodities which would be supplied under it, and also the areas in which the agreement would be carried out. In Japan's opinion the new trade relationship should be put into effect throughout Great Britain's colonies, and not be limited to England itself.[976]

381. Japan Investigates British Military Preparations in Iran

In view of its alliances under the Tripartite Pact, Japan believes that it had to fear not only British economic pressure in the Far East but also the effects of British military preparations in other parts of the world on its ally, Germany. Since the European War had allied Great Britain with Russia, Tokyo was concerned with the trend of events in Iran where unforeseen developments might easily turn the tide of the Russo-German war.

For information gathered by the head of the Mitsubishi Branch in Iran, Tokyo learned of an increase in British shipping at ports on the Persian Gulf. By docking an average of five ships daily, Great Britain had brought the number of British and Australian troops in the area up to 200,000. In addition, trucks, speedboats equipped with depth bombs, machine guns and other military supplies were being unloaded rapidly. Yet in spite of the twenty-eight cranes used in these unloading operations, many ships were still anchored in the outer harbor at Basra waiting to put their cargoes ashore.[977]

In view of the fact that the British army had commandeered in Basra between 350 and 400 lighters, and had equipped them with plank covers, it seemed probable that the British were preparing to land their men and supplies in frontal assault on German lines. This theory was further substantiated by British use of the newly-completed railroad from the Basra harbor to Kuweit and by indications of a new connection with Bahrein Island.

Apparently, the Iranian government feared British preparations for war on its territory. On August 5, 1941 at the commemoration of the promulgation of the Constitution, Mr. Mobangaru, an influential member of the Iranian Parliament, warned his fellow members that Iran must prepare against joint British and Russian pressure. Mr. Mobangaru had been attacked by the Director of the British Imperial Bank in Iran because of the pro-German attitude in the country.[978]

After receiving this information concerning British military activities in Iran, the Japanese representative there went to the German Minister. In spite of the fact that the source of Japanese information was supposedly authentic, the German Minister refused to believe that either British troops or supplies were as numerous as reported; he considered the information to be English propaganda. Nevertheless, the Japanese representative in his message to the

[975] III, 720.
[976] Ibid.
[977] III, 721.
[978] Ibid.

[202]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Foreign Minister on August 18, 1941 warned his government that the situation in Iran had grown extremely critical since the onset of the Russo-German war.[979]

Although the Iranian Foreign Office denied the rumor, there seemed to be some truth in the statement that Great Britain had requested permission to transport its troops through the country. It was rumored, too, that on August 5, 1941 the American Legation had secretly advised the evacuation of Americans from Iran.

Once the Russo-German war had been concluded, Japanese sources warned, the dangerous situation existing in Iran would be brought to a head, for then German troops would encroach upon the northern border of Iran and Great Britain would use Iran as a buffer state for the protection of India.

The statement by Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Anthony Eden, that Britain only wished to protect Iran from German Fifth Columnists was regarded merely as a British excuse. In fact, because the German Minister in Iran realized that the British government might make the first move to protect British oil companies, he was attempting to align the Iranians with the Axis by a policy of not irritating them in any manner.[980]

382. Japanese Business Firms Charge Singapore Police with Oppression

The Kobayashi firm, which for the past three years had been granted permits to carry on its business activities in Singapore, reported in August 1941 that oppressive measures were being taken against it. In order not to aggravate the situation, on August 25, 1941 Tokyo advised that the books of this concern be put in order to meet the control measures of the British authorities in Singapore. However, in retaliation not only was a strong protest to be made to Ambassador Robert Craigie, but British propaganda in Japan was to be curtailed.[981]

383. Tokyo Continues Negotiations for Barter with British

A Japanese Cabinet meeting on August 26, 1941 decided to continue negotiations for reciprocal trade with the British.[982] Since the proposed use of a barter system was designed to adjust the existing trade balances between British and Japanese banks, Tokyo believed that the terms should be drawn up by the Yokohama Specie Bank and by the British Dutch Bank, without any public announcement before or after a final plan was evolved.[983] Therefore, on August 27, 1941 Mr. Hisaakira Kano, branch manager of the Specie Bank in London, was notified of the arrangement.[984]

Although the original British proposal was acceptable almost as submitted, certain revisions in the articles and phraseology were still under discussion. Because the transportation of the material would be effected largely by Japanese ships, the Japanese government believed that England should furnish the necessary fuel and should extend certain facilities to Japan's cargo vessels. On August 27, 1941 Tokyo requested its London Embassy to present this stipulation in writing to the British.[985]

384. Foreign Minister Toyoda Criticizes Editorial Policy of Singapore Herald

Foreign Minister Toyoda warned the Japanese representatives in Singapore on August 28, 1941 to see to it that the Herald did not publish more editorials which were anti-Axis in tone.[986] Japanese authorities in Singapore replied that, whereas it was impossible for them to

[979] III, 722.
[980] Ibid.
[981] III, 723.
[982] III, 724.
[983] III, 725.
[984] III, 726.
[985] III, 725.
[986] III, 727.

[203]

direct the writing of each article, they had informed the paper of what its editorial policy should be: namely, to avoid provoking the British and to give the impression that Japan's aims, interfering in no way with the rights and interests of the English, were directed toward a Far Eastern peace.

A month before, in July 1941, British authorities in Singapore, through Mr. Scott, the former chief of the Far Eastern Section, had warned Mr. Jones, the Herald's editorial writer, that it was particularly inadvisable for an Englishman to write such analytical and critical editorials for a Japanese newspaper. Nevertheless, Mr. Jones had chosen to remain on the staff. According to the Japanese report, it was clear that the Herald's editorial, which had aroused much comment, had not been written under Japanese direction, but it was regrettable that Japan had permitted the publication of material suitable for use in British propaganda.[987]

385. Canada Imposes Restrictions on Foreign Messages

Because of Canada's proximity to the United States and England, its reactions to international diplomatic situations were carefully noted by the Japanese Embassy in Ottawa as an indication of trends common among the Allied nations. It was reported from Ottawa on August 26, 1941 that because of its entrance into the European war, Canada was prohibiting even the clearance of official foreign code and clear text telegrams when addressed to or sent by a private individual.

Although conscious that inconveniences would naturally arise, the Canadian government was resolute in allowing the transmission of only those official messages between Japanese consular offices in Canada and the United States which were clearly marked "Japanese Consul" or "Japanese Consul General."[988]

386. Canada Plans to Exchange Ministers with Chungking Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

Only a few days later Japan received evidence of Canada's tendency toward pro-Chinese and anti-Japanese policies. From Ambassador Seijiro Yoshizawa in Ottawa came a report on August 30, 1941 of a rumor that Canada was planning to exchange ministers with the Chungking government. To determine the truth of the story appearing in local Canadian newspapers, the Japanese Ambassador in Ottawa questioned Prime Minister MacKensie King. He learned that diplomatic negotiations to effect such an exchange had been underway for some time, aided by the British Ambassador in Chungking.[989]

In view of the establishment of the Japanese-sponsored regime at Nanking,[990] Ambassador Yoshizawa impressed the Canadian Prime Minister with the advisability of notifying Japan prior to any official decision.[991]

387. Tokyo Permits British Evacuation from Japan

Although diplomatic relations were still not severed, both Japan and England continued arrangements for evacuating their nationals from the other's territory.

At the request of the British Ambassador in Tokyo, the Japanese government issued an oral statement granting the same facilities for the arrival and departure of British evacuation ships at Japanese ports, as had been guaranteed to Ambassador Mamoru Shigamitsu in London, when the Fushimi Maru removed Japanese subjects from Great Britain.[992]

[987] III, 728.
[988] III, 729.
[989] II, 730.
[990] Japan has set up a puppet government in Nanking. See II, Japanese-Nanking Relation.
[991] III, 730.
[992] III, 731.

[204]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

In return for the safe passage of British ships, Japan instructed its Ambassador in London, on August 28, 1941, to obtain further assurance that nothing would hinder its vessels from taking Japanese nationals aboard at Karachi, British India.[993]

388. Tokyo Evacuates Nationals in British Territory

As preparations for the evacuation of Japanese nationals from all British territories progressed, Tokyo, on August 29, 1941, ordered its Ambassador in London to explain to the British authorities that the Matsumoto Maru at Calcutta and another ship at Durban had no accommodations for the evacuees from Mombasa in Kenya, South Africa. Since it would be necessary to dispatch two other Japanese ships for that purpose, a guarantee of safe passage was requested by the Japanese government.[994]

389. Britain Guarantees Safe Passage for Hakone Maru

Negotiations were continued in order to obtain further guarantees on the part of both the Japanese and British governments that no obstacle would be placed in the way of the evacuation ships.

According to an agreement with Ambassador Robert Craigie in Tokyo, safe transit for the Hakone Maru, sailing through the Persian Gulf en route to Bombay, was assured. In exchange, English ships, sent to Japan and China for the evacuation of British and Allied nationals, were granted similar facilities.[995]

390. British and Japanese Banks Negotiate Trade Settlements

The beginning of September 1941 found Japanese and British banking concerns negotiating for further trade between the two countries. Tokyo revealed that authorities of the British Netherlands Bank had approached the London branch of the Yokohama Specie Bank about the possibility of establishing a settlement account to facilitate commercial payments.

The Yokohama Specie Bank proposed that before arranging such a system, a list of materials for export by both the British and Japanese governments be drawn up for discussion. The Japanese government was anxious to carry on trade with British territories and colonies in cotton goods and other miscellaneous materials known to be lacking in these areas. Tokyo felt that such a measure would alleviate some of the trade problems which had resulted from the British freezing order.[996]

391. Japanese Embassy in London Discloses Background of Atlantic Charter

On September 2, 1941 the Japanese government sent to Berlin a report received from the Japanese Embassy in London concerning the background of the Atlantic Charter signed by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill on August 14, 1941.[997]

From the information received it was learned that the eight points of the Atlantic Charter were originated by President Roosevelt. Because these points touched upon the question of the distribution of territories throughout Europe, Prime Minister Churchill hesitated to sign the document at first, fearing that diplomatic problems might arise in consequence. President Roosevelt then pointed out that the American public had assumed an extremely heavy burden of taxation in order to give necessary aid to Britain. If the American public came to feel that it was involved in a war merely for the benefit of Great Britain, great dissatisfaction would result. When President Roosevelt stressed that therefore a statement must be issued precisely

[993 Ibid.
[994] III, 732.
[995] III, 733.
[996] III, 734.
[997] III, 735.

[205]

because the European war was so serious a problem involving not only Great Britain but the entire world, Prime Minister Churchill agreed to adopt the Atlantic Charter.

As had been expected, the question of the distribution of territories caused friction between the allied European countries. Soviet Russia, in particular, had many questions to pose regarding this problem.

With regard to the problems in the Far East, the Japanese Embassy in London stated that Great Britain believed America's attitude toward Japan to be more lenient than its own, since the United States was continuing its informal conversations with Japan.[998]

392. Japanese Embassy Comments on Situations in Iran and Africa

This same report from the Japanese Embassy in London commented on the situations in both Iran and Africa. With regard to its invasion of Iran, Great Britain realized the difficulty of preserving peace in neighboring countries if she resorted to conquest by force. Therefore, Great Britain hoped to carry out only a minor aggression in Iran and to attain its major objectives by negotiations with the Iranian government.

Although developments in Iran at first gave hope to these expectations, the British government faced the fact that the Russian troops showed no signs of stopping their advance into Iran from the north. Only after the Soviet forces had secured the northern end of the railroad and the area adjoining the Caucasus did they intend to cease operations. The British troops had already secured the oil fields in the southern part of the trans-Iran railroad, however, and since neither army had sent troops to Teheran, efforts were still underway for peaceful negotiations with the Iranian government.

Meanwhile, in Africa, the Vichy government was attempting to forestall a move for independence on the part of the French African colonies by putting General Huntziger in command of all African forces. Because of his great popularity, the Vichy government could not risk dismissing General Weygand; therefore, it had been necessary to make him second in command.

The British government had refrained from aiding the pending struggle for independence among the French African colonies since it was felt that once this independence was secured, Berlin would take advantage of the situation by sending German troops into Spain.[999]

393. British-Russian Advance Cuts Off German Escape

By the first part of September 1941 the situation in Iran had become so critical that the German Legation burned its general documents and prepared to flee Teheran. Because of the rapidly advancing British and Russian troops, however, escape was cut off. The German nationals in Teheran were faced either with becoming captives of the Allies, or with taking cover and carrying on anti-British and anti-Russian activities until aid from the German army reached them. Whatever their choice, it was now obvious that once Iran capitulated, British-Russian occupation would leave the Caucasus open to Allied aid and German forces, fighting in Russia, would be placed in a precarious position.[1000]

394. Japanese Intelligence Discloses Possibility of German Attack on Turkey

On September 5, 1941 the Japanese Embassy in London sent Tokyo reliable information concerning the possible occupation of Near-East territories by British, Soviet, and German troops. The Japanese Embassy disclosed that when the British and Russian governments had first demanded the expulsion of Germans from Iran, Turkey and Egypt had been sympathetic with the Iranian government. However, both Iran and Turkey asked that, in case Russia should

[998] Ibid.
[999] Ibid.
[1000] III, 736.

[206]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

invade Iran, Britain then enter the country presumably to prevent Russian occupation of Teheran and possible outrages against the populace and king. If Great Britain should fail to make this move, the Turkish militarists, pro-German in their sentiments, would find it an excuse to collaborate with the Axis nations.

Although the German Ambassador to Turkey, Mr. Papen, had made no special demands on that government, his return to Berlin was considered an indication of a future German invasion of Turkey. On the other hand, Japanese intelligence reports pointed out that Germany recognized the difficulty of breaking through the plains of Anatolia and, rather than risk failure, the Berlin government might refrain from an attack at the present time.

Though Admiral Raeder had recently visited Bulgaria, a well-informed person disclosed that the purpose of his visit was to negotiate for the use of Bulgaria's harbors in the event of a war on the Black Sea. While an Italian squadron might be able to assist Germany by invading the Black Sea, Japanese intelligence reports pointed out that the Dardanelles Straits would still have to be controlled before this move could prove of any real value.[1001]

395. Disposition of British Fleet Affects German-French Peace Negotiations

Information from the Japanese Embassy in London on September 5, 1941 also disclosed certain problems connected with the establishment of final peace negotiations between Vichy France and Germany. The disposition of the British fleet, threatening the German and Italian supply route to Libya, had been largely responsible for the resignation of Admiral La Rocque, Vichy's director of naval strategy, and the demotion of General Weygand. Because German and Italian ships feared attack by the British, a route to Libya through the harbor of Bizerte in French-held Tunis had been contemplated. Since General Weygand and Admiral La Rocque had opposed this move, there had been a shake-up in the French military and naval high command which had had a telling affect upon French politics.

Furthermore, Italy's claims on the French colonies in Africa, Corsica, Nice, and Savoy and the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany had such a bad affect upon French public opinion that Vichy could not afford to ratify peace negotiations with Germany at the present time.[1002]

396. Canadian Prime Minister Advocates American Aid to Britain

On September 5, 1941 Tokyo also received information concerning a speech made by Canada's Prime Minister, Mr. MacKenzie King, at an informal dinner-party given by the Mayor of London.

Since his arrival in Great Britain, Prime Minister King had openly advocated all-out aid to Britain by the United States as a means of attaining a common objective. With the backing of Prime Minister Churchill, King made a speech emphasizing that a new world order, based on freedom, could only be achieved by complete British-American cooperation.

The attitude of other British leaders toward the European war was causing a political rift in Great Britain. Recently, Mr. Moore-Brabazon, the Minister of Aircraft Production, had openly declared that Great Britain could take advantage of the war-exhaustion of Germany and Russia to advance its own production of war materials. As a result of this statement, Mr. Tanner, the head of the Amalgamated Engineers' Union, had attacked Minister Moore-Brabazon at a meeting at which Air Minister Attlee and Economic Warfare Administrator Dalton were present. At the coming session of Parliament, careful attention was to be given to the problems which had arisen from the differing views of the two men.[1003]

[1001] III, 737.
[1002] Ibid.
[1003] Ibid.

[207]

397. Japan Fears British-Chinese Collaboration

Since British relations with Far Eastern territories had a definite bearing on their attitude toward Japan, Tokyo watched with growing concern the obvious tendencies toward increased British-Chinese collaboration. Although both British and Chinese authorities were avoiding any definite statement concerning the extent of cooperation between their countries, and while no actual treaty was believed to exist, Mr. Tateki Horiuchi, in Shanghai, quoted a Reuters dispatch from Chungking in the early part of September 1941, which stated that British and Chinese military leaders constantly coordinated their activities.

A United Press news report quoted the British Naval Attache to the United States as saying that if America entered the war, Britain would permit it to use Singapore. Furthermore, Ambassador Archibald Kerr had admitted that relations between England and China were closer than imagined by the world at large.[1004]

A little over a week later confirmation of British-Chinese military cooperation was found in a Japanese intelligence report. After investigating the distribution and quartering of troops around Lashio, a Japanese spy revealed that military conferences between the British and Chinese leaders had been held twice monthly since July, 1941. On September 6, 1941 Lashio was filled with Chinese soldiers, who were holding maneuvers with British troops.[1005]

By September 10, 1941 Chinese forces had been strengthened by 1000 men ready to move southwards from Lashio in trucks. Other detachments arriving from Kunming in the latter part of September 1941 were apparently to be stationed near Wanten and Shaho, where military barracks were under construction and underground ammunition dumps, invisible from the sky, were nearly completed.[1006]

Later in September 1941 another spy report disclosed that thousands of trucks carrying gasoline, arms, ammunition, cotton and miscellaneous equipment had been arriving at Yunan during August, and arms and ammunition had been sent to reinforce the Chinese at Fushan.[1007]

398. Britain Suppresses Japanese Propaganda in China

In order to protect its interest in China, Great Britain found it necessary to suppress Japanese propaganda there. Disturbed by Japan's varied activities in China, the British authorities curtailed travel and placed restrictions on newspaper articles and radio talks. Furthermore, all mail from Chinese nationals in occupied territories was opened and censored, and all Chinese working with Japan were watched by the police. Members of the Chinese Communist party, who had been merely feigning anti-Japanese sentiments, found their activities suppressed by British officials.[1008]

In an attempt to counteract the effects of this British surveillance, Japanese authorities at Singapore suggested to Tokyo on September 9, 1941 that the National government of China establish a radio station to broadcast pro-Japanese propaganda, which would emphasize the futility of China's continuing its resistance to Japan. It would also stress that the present National government, established in the occupied areas of China, was actually the legitimate successor to the Nationalist party established by Mr. Sun Yat-sen.[1009]

399. Britain Seeks Chinese Translators

British preparations for war in the Far East were reported by the Japanese, who stated that British authorities were making a survey of Englishmen in North China, Hongkong and Shang-

[1004] III, 738.
[1005] III, 739.
[1006] III, 740.
[1007] III, 741.
[1008] III, 742.
[1009] Ibid .

No comments: